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HOPEFUL CLARITY OR HOPELESS DISARRAY?: AN 
EXAMINATION OF TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY 
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Krista M. Pikus+ 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”1  While this Clause may 
seem straightforward, history and differing interpretations have led to an 
unresolved debate over its meaning and application.2  Most First Amendment 
scholars agree that U.S. Supreme Court caselaw interpreting the Establishment 
Clause is a conflicted muddle.3  This is no new condition; Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas opined twenty years ago that “our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray.”4 
In the spring of 2014, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to remedy the 
malady of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence with Town of Greece v. 
                                                     
 + J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.S. in Business, B.A. in Psychology, Miami University, 
2012.  I am grateful for Notre Dame’s Program on Church, State & Society for the opportunity to 
learn about the Establishment Clause from a seminar co-taught by Associate Justice Clarence 
Thomas of the Supreme Court of the United States and Professor Richard Garnett.  I am also 
grateful for Professor Donald L. Drakeman’s comments and insights on this piece, the staff 
members of the Catholic University Law Review for their hard work editing this piece, and my 
family for their continuous love and support.  All errors are my own. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. See Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment 
Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 495–96; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation 
of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. 
L.J. 669, 670–72 (2013); Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment 
Clause and the Impossibility of its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 588–604 (2006); 
Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 73, 76–78 (2005); see also William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original 
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930–31 (1986) (noting ambiguities in the historical record 
regarding whether the Establishment Clause was intended to allow accommodation of religion or 
require strict separation). 
 3. See Patrick M. Garry, Distorting the Establishment Clause into an Individual Dissenter’s 
Right, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 661–62 (2013); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme 
Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (“It is by now axiomatic 
that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused 
and deeply contradictory.”); Shannon Chapla, ND Expert: SCOTUS Ruled Correctly on Legislative 
Prayer, NOTRE DAME NEWS (May 5, 2014), http://news.nd.edu/news/48143-nd-expert-scotus-
ruled-correctly-on-legislative-prayer/ (“[T]he law in this area remains as muddled and difficult to 
apply as . . . it has been for the past 30 years.”). 
 4. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice 
Thomas’s view has not since grown more favorable.  See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. 
Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (protesting this “jurisprudence in 
shambles” and “this Court’s nebulous Establishment Clause analyses” that “has confounded the 
lower courts”). 
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Galloway.5  There, the Court held that a New York town’s practice of opening 
its town board meetings with a prayer offered by clergy members did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.6  The Court, however, did not use any of its previously 
enumerated tests for assessing Establishment Clause violations.7  Instead, the 
Court focused on the historical pedigree of government invocations and the 
nondiscriminatory procedures the town implemented in its invocation practice.8 
Despite the Court’s resolution of Town of Greece by an appeal to tradition,9 
the test the Court will use to assess future Establishment Clause challenges in 
other factual contexts remains unpredictable.10  This Essay asks whether there is 
any hope for clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence after Town of Greece.  
Part I analyzes the confusion surrounding current Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, and Parts II and III analyze what is wrong with that jurisprudence.  
Lastly, Part IV analyzes possible solutions for remedying the confusion and 
misapplication of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and proposes modest 
steps to achieve that goal.  Specifically, it discusses practical and theoretical 
implications of these solutions and focuses on whether amending the level of 
scrutiny used in Establishment Clause cases is a viable option. 
I.  CONFUSION ABOUT THE TRUE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE? 
Interpretations of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause typically 
fall on a spectrum between strict-separationism and nonpreferentialism.11  In one 
contentious context, government financial subsidies, the current debate focuses 
on whether the Establishment Clause permits nonpreferential aid to religion or 
requires strict separation forbidding any government aid to religions.12  Another 
                                                     
 5. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 6. Id. at 1828. 
 7. See infra notes 182–90 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824–28. 
 9. Id. at 1828. 
 10. See Chapla, supra note 3. 
 11. See Munoz, supra note 2, at 588–604; Natelson, supra note 2, at 76–78; see also Marshall, 
supra note 2, at 930–31 (discussing ambiguities in the historical record regarding whether the 
Establishment Clause was intended to allow accommodation of religion or require strict 
separation).  Outside these boundaries are yet other approaches to the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.  See infra Part I.B. 
 12. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99–106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The 
Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did 
it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.”); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“The concept of a ‘wall’ of separation is a useful figure of 
speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson.  The metaphor has served as a reminder 
that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching it.  But the 
metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that 
in fact exists between church and state.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 (1983) 
(discussing the purposes of “separation” and “neutrality” within the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause). 
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prominent dispute centers on the government’s authority to evince support for 
religious positions.13 
In 1878, the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States14 first considered the 
relevance of the Establishment Clause to the famous metaphor Thomas Jefferson 
included in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.15  Jefferson wrote that 
the Establishment Clause built a “wall of separation between church and 
State.”16  In 1947, the Supreme Court again invoked this “wall of separation” 
metaphor in Everson v. Board of Education,17 holding that the Establishment 
Clause binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.18  The function and 
significance of Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor remains contested.19 
While the history preceding the Establishment Clause is largely undisputed, 
the debate rages over which historical facts are most important, how they should 
be understood, and how they should control the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.20 
A.  Historical Background 
One difficulty in interpreting the Establishment Clause is that the historical 
record appears to present support for different sides of the debate.  For instance, 
many people cite Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association or James 
                                                     
 13. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 803–04, 804 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The second purpose of 
separation and neutrality is to keep the state from interfering in the essential autonomy of religious 
life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious issues, or by unduly involving itself in the 
supervision of religious institutions or officials . . . .  A court, for example, will refuse to decide an 
essentially religious issue even if the issue is otherwise properly before the court, and even if it is 
asked to decide it.”). 
 14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 15. Id. at 163–64.  The Court quoted Thomas Jefferson’s letter and found it authoritative in 
interpreting the Establishment Clause: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; 
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers 
of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign 
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between church and State. 
Id. at 164. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 18. Id. at 15–16. 
 19. See William J. Cornelius, Church and State—The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: 
Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 11–13 (1984); Arlen Specter, 
Defending the Wall: Maintaining Church/State Separation in America, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 575, 577 (1995); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“The concept of a ‘wall’ 
of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson.  The 
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or 
anything approaching it.”). 
 20. See generally Specter, supra note 19. 
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Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance in support of a separationist approach.21  
Others refer to those same sources as consistent with religious accommodation.22  
Adding further complexity is the apparent tensions within the views and acts of 
these notable Founding-Era figures.23  When Madison was President, he sat on 
a committee that appointed a congressional chaplain and proclaimed national 
days of prayer.24  However, when Madison was in retirement, he wrote in 
opposition to such practices.25  While Thomas Jefferson wrote of a “wall of 
separation,”26 he also approved federal funding for a Christian missionary 
performing outreach to the Native Americans.27  These seemingly contradictory 
actions and words lead us to ask: wherein lies the Framers’ true intent and the 
original meaning of the text? 
One interpretive aid to understanding the true intent of the Framers is the 
legislative history.  Resolving the proper relationship between church and state 
does not appear to have been on the list of priorities for the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution.28  Instead, the religion clauses were a response to the demands of 
several states for a Bill of Rights in the Constitution as a condition for 
ratification.29 
Although few details are recorded in the debate regarding the Establishment 
Clause, several states did raise concerns over the prospect of the establishment 
of a national church.30  Even though the history often conflicts, the primary 
intention of the First Congress seems to be at least clear on one point: to prevent 
                                                     
 21. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 
677, 724–25 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590, 608 (1992); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; Walz 
v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 685 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Sch. Dist. of Abington 
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 (1962); Everson, 
330 U.S. at 16; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163–64. 
 22. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153–66 (1991). 
 23. David Barton, The Image and the Reality: Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment, 
17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 402–03 (2003) (arguing that “there are vast 
numbers of Jefferson quotes and actions which, should they be considered seriously by the Court, 
would cause at least a serious reassessment of its landmark Establishment Clause rulings and quite 
probably a dramatic reversal”).  In addition, either the “fervent religionists” or the “ardent 
secularists” could cite Jefferson’s quotes and actions as authority. 
 24. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88, 788 n.8 (1983). 
 25. Id. at 807, 815 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 26. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164). 
 27. See Barton, supra note 23, at 404; James A. Davids, Putting Faith in Prison Programs, 
and Its Constitutionality Under Thomas Jefferson’s Faith-Based Initiative, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
341, 342 (2008). 
 28. See Barton, supra note 23, at 436–39 (illustrating that the “separation of Church and 
State” was never once mentioned in the Constitutional Convention debates). 
 29. See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 213–18 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). 
 30. Id. at 198. 
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Congress from establishing a national church or religion.31  Although the 
prohibition of a national church may be clear, how religion is defined from a 
constitutional perspective is not.32 
B.  Meaning of the Text 
Evidenced by scholars’ varying proposals, discerning the original meaning of 
the language of the Establishment Clause is challenging.33  The Framers did not 
include definitions for the words in the First Amendment because the 
circumstances giving rise to the Bill of Rights did not require them to define 
such terms.34  One scholar suggests that the meaning of “establishment” was 
undergoing transition and was being used in a variety of ways during the time 
of the nation’s Founding.35  The word “establishment” was often used 
inconsistently during the Founding Era.36  Some evidence suggests that taxes to 
support religious purposes might be permissible, yet some Founders viewed that 
as an indication of an establishment.37 
Even if there were multiple connotations for “establishment,” other language 
in the Clause is still heavily debated.38  Many have interpreted “respecting an 
establishment of religion” to be evidence of the enhanced federalism argument 
to ensure the federal government would not interfere with state establishments.39  
The Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU40 discussed other phrases 
that may have been used instead of “respecting,” such as “touching,”41 and 
concluded that a government display of religious symbols falls under the 
                                                     
 31. Id. at 231. 
 32. Krista M. Pikus, Comment, Quasi-Rights for Quasi-Religious Organizations: A New 
Framework Resolving Religious-Secular Dichotomy After Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 16, 18–21 (2014). 
 33. See PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 9–10 (Harv. Univ. Press, 
2004); Natelson, supra note 2, at 76–78; see also Lisa Shaw Roy, History, Transparency, and the 
Establishment Clause: A Proposal for Reform, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 683, 715 (2008) (advocating 
for a procedural solution in which the Court separates its treatment of history from its analysis of 
law). 
 34. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 226; WILLIAM GERALD MCLOUGHLIN, NEW 
ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630–1833, at 783 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971). 
 35. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 216. 
 36. Id. at 230–60. 
 37. Id. at 232–33. 
 38. Id. at 180–85. 
 39. See id. at 232–44, 319; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “the Establishment Clause is a federalism 
provision”). 
 40. 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 41. Id. 649. 
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establishment prohibition.42  An even more fundamental question is: what is 
“religion”?43 
C.  Difficulty in Defining Religion 
One of the biggest challenges presented in cases governed by the religion 
clauses is determining whether an organization or practice constitutes 
“religion.”44  This particular challenge is marked in the case of a religion not in 
existence or present in the American experience when the Constitution was 
drafted.45  It is argued that at a minimum, the Framers conceived religion to be 
theistic.46  Regardless, courts have held that newer religions deserve full First 
Amendment protection.47  While there is some evidence that one motivation for 
including the religion clauses was to avert political contest among sects of 
Christianity, they are now considered to apply to all religions.48  Generally, 
though, courts have avoided defining religion because doing so, as some assert, 
would violate the Establishment Clause.49  Alternatively, it may be due to the 
conceptual difficulty of the task.50 
                                                     
 42. Id. at 613–21. 
 43. See, e.g., Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 309, 356–91 (1994); Michael Rhea, Denying and Defining Religion Under the First 
Amendment: Waldorf Education as a Lens for Advocating a Broad Definitional Approach, 72 LA. 
L. REV. 1095, 1103–09 (2012); Jane M. Ritter, The Legal Definition of Religion: From Eating Cat 
Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV. 751, 761–86 (2004); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining 
Religion: The Struggle To Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and 
Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and 
Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 144-87 (2007). 
 44. See Pikus, supra note 32, at 18–21 (discussing the current legal standard for classifying 
organizations as religious); cf. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts To Define Religion: The 
Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious 
Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 757 n.69 (2005) (discussing the paradoxical effect 
that sometimes occurs when courts attempt to define organizations as religious). 
 45. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1315 (D.N.J. 1977), aff’d per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 
(3d Cir. 1979) (arguing that while today there are “philosophies and theories recognized as religions 
or religious practices” that were unknown at the time the Constitution was drafted, the meaning of 
religion has expanded over time and would fall under the First Amendment). 
 46. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 
757–58 (1984). 
 47. See Malnak, 440 F. Supp. at 1315. 
 48. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985)). 
 49. See Usman, supra note 43, at 145 (“[D]efining religion would violate the Constitution by 
interfering with religious liberty and establishing religion.”). 
 50. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“The 
determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate 
task . . .”); see also Usman, supra note 43, at 145 (discussing the difficulty the courts would face 
in attempting to define religion). 
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Despite popular resistance to defining religion, some courts and scholars have 
attempted to do so.51  That effort navigates a fine line between an impermissible 
questioning of the validity of religious beliefs and a permissible questioning of 
whether a set of beliefs is a “religion” under the First Amendment.52  Although 
many have attempted to define religion,53 its definition remains a delicate 
question for courts deciding religious liberty claims.54  One approach to this task 
identifies instances when the concept indisputably applies and then evaluates 
more doubtful cases by analogizing them to the indisputable instances.55  This 
method has been viewed as a safeguard against arbitrary judicial classifications 
of religions.56 
The modern Supreme Court has avoided defining religion,57 though it 
previously gave some indication of what it considers to be a religion.58  In 1890, 
the Supreme Court in Davis v. Beason59 stated that “‘religion’ has reference to 
one’s views of his relations to his Creator.”60  In United States v. Macintosh,61 
the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he essence of religion is [a] belief in a relation 
to God.”62  Even James Madison, who is often cited to support strict-
                                                     
 51. See Feofanov, supra note 43, at 363–66, 368, 371, 374–90; Rhea, supra note 43, at 1103–
08; Usman, supra note 43, at 151–54, 165–88, 193–96, 200–17. 
 52. Compare Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1979) (declaring “no prohibition[] 
. . . against ruling whether or not a set of beliefs constitutes a religion”), with United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944) (“So we conclude that the District Court ruled properly when it 
withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or 
doctrines of respondents.”); see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633–34 (1931) 
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (describing religion as a “belief in a relation to God involving duties 
superior to those arising from any human relation”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) 
(describing religion as “reference to one’s views of his relations [and obligations] to his Creator”). 
 53. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 579, 587–89, 593–95; see generally James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law, 
Anthropology, and the Definition of “Religion”, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23 (1995).  But see 
Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 469 
(2004) (arguing that such attempts to define religion are misguided and “will not help . . . [with 
interpreting] the religion clauses”). 
 54. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“The determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is 
more often than not a difficult and delicate task . . .”). 
 55. See Greenawalt, supra note 46, at 763. 
 56. See Eduardo Peñalver, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 794 (1997). 
 57. While the courts currently have no definitive test to define religion, some cases provide 
insight to relevant factors.  See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 
(3d Cir. 2007) (highlighting some of the factors the court examined in determining whether an 
organization was religious, including: “(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it 
produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent 
documents state a religious purpose, [or] (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with, or financially 
supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or synagogue”). 
 58. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
 59. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
 60. Id. at 342. 
 61. 283 U.S. 605 (1931). 
 62. Id. at 633 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). 
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separationism, speaks multiple times of a duty to the “Creator” in his Memorial 
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.63 
As there was uncertainty pertaining to the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause during the Founding Era, it is hard to expect a clear understanding of that 
language today.64  Evidence indicates that the language can reasonably be 
interpreted multiple ways.65 
II.  WHICH INTERPRETATION SHOULD CONTROL? 
The participants in the debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause 
confidently cite history to support their position.66  Some Justices, including 
Justice Hugo Black, supported the strict-separation approach,67 while others, 
such as Justice William Rehnquist, advocated for the nonpreferential approach.68  
On the other hand, Justice Thomas has advocated that the Establishment Clause 
is an enhanced federalism provision to prevent the federal government from 
interfering with states’ establishments.69  Each of these approaches has its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
                                                     
 63. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 
2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901); see also Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (citing Madison, supra, at 187); Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and 
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 783, 798 (2002).  Madison wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance: 
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every 
man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.  This right is in 
its nature an unalienable right . . .  It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.  This duty is precedent 
both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. 
Madison, supra, at 184–85.  For a discussion regarding the validity of Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance, see Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in THE 
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 2–4 (Marvin 
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). 
 64. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 65. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra Part I. 
 67. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (referring to a “wall of separation”); see also DAVID L. GREY, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 40–41 (1968); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 
522–23 (2d ed. 1997). 
 68. See Russell M. Mortyn, The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment Clause, 19 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 567, 574–75 (1992). 
 69. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“I write separately to reiterate my view that the Establishment Clause is ‘best understood as a 
federalism provision.’” (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring))); DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 232–47 (discussing the theory and 
credibility of Justice Thomas’s enhanced federalism interpretation of the Establishment Clause). 
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A.  Strict-Separationism 
Support for strict-separationism often relies on Jefferson’s views and his “wall 
of separation” metaphor.70  Numerous Supreme Court cases have cited 
Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor as a means of maintaining this separation.71  
Evidence reveals that Jefferson harbored hostility towards religion.72  
Furthermore, this strict-separationism view lacks constitutional authority.73  
While the principle of “separation of Church and State” possesses some value, 
the words themselves are not found in the Constitution.74  Some scholars 
recommend that the phrase and idea it conveys should be viewed with suspicion, 
given that it was a development from prejudice.75 
B.  Nonpreferentialism 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree76 provides a powerful 
endorsement of nonpreferentialism.77  He maintained that the actions of the First 
Congress confirm the view that the government should not prefer one religious 
sect to another,78 but that accommodating religious faith and practice is 
acceptable and was common during the Founding Era79  (e.g., national days of 
prayer and Thanksgiving,80 the Northwest Ordinance’s legislative favor for 
religious education,81 and land grants supporting religion82). 
As evidence that the nonpreferential viewpoint triumphs, some scholars point 
to the Framers’ choice of “an” establishment of religion over “the” establishment 
of religion.83  Still, no persuasive evidence exists that the First Congress assigned 
such significance to that distinction.84 
When examining the totality of the evidence and the actions of the Framers, 
the nonpreferentialism approach seems more reasonable than the strict-
                                                     
 70. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 424–25. 
 71. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600–01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 91–92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 72. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 63. 
 73. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (The words “wall of separation” and “separation of Church 
and State” do not appear in the First Amendment). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See HAMBURGER, supra note 33, at 481–83. 
 76. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 77. Id. at 106, 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 100. 
 79. Id. at 101–03. 
 80. See id. at 113. 
 81. Id. at 100. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 179. 
 84. Id. at 211–12. 
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separationist approach.85  However, given its major religious pluralism, 
nonpreferentialism does not seem practicable in the current polity.86  This is not 
a criticism of the nonpreferentialist interpretation but rather a practical 
consideration.  Because today’s circumstances have changed, some advocate for 
a more workable approach.87  Importantly, however, changing the rule to reflect 
the changing times may inadvertently unsettle the enduring meaning and 
predictable operation of the Constitution in the long term.88  Additionally, new 
proposed frameworks must beware of inviting judges to speculate on what 
today’s culture requires, thereby extending, rather than cabining, judicial 
discretion.89 
C.  Enhanced Federalism 
The “enhanced federalism” interpretation advocates the view that the purpose 
of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit the federal government from 
interfering with state establishments.90  While this viewpoint has support, it is 
unlikely that the sole purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect state 
establishments, as such a view contradicts historical evidence.91  If members of 
the First Congress intended for this interpretation to apply, it was not recorded 
in the proposed language.92  The majority of the records from the ratification 
conventions and debates indicate that the Establishment Clause was intended to 
prohibit the federal government from establishing a national religion.93  Even 
James Madison, who is often cited in support of a separationist approach, 
proposed the language “no national religion shall be established,” indicating that 
perhaps even he did not think this should be implemented against the states.94 
D.  Incorporation Doctrine 
Even if the Establishment Clause was only intended to prohibit Congress from 
establishing a national religion, the Supreme Court held in Everson that the 
Establishment Clause applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.95  
Justice Thomas maintains that this is a flawed interpretation because the 
                                                     
 85. For instance, several Founders who were later elected President proclaimed national days 
of prayer and thanksgiving during their respective presidencies.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 633–35 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 86. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, The Future of Religious Pluralism: Justice 
O’Connor and the Establishment Clause, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 895, 948 (2007). 
 87. See id. at 943, 945, 947. 
 88. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 89. See infra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 90. DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 211. 
 91. See id. at 229. 
 92. Id. at 235–36. 
 93. Id. at 241. 
 94. Id. at 206. 
 95. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
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Establishment Clause resists incorporation by virtue of its underlying purpose.96  
Justice Thomas believes that incorporation of the Establishment Clause 
frustrates its original intention to allow states the freedom to make church-state 
decisions without federal interference.97 
While this interpretation is plausible based on the language of the Clause, the 
records of the debate in the Annals of Congress do not contain specific support 
for it.98  Additionally, even if this were the intent, it was neither discussed nor 
considered a relevant issue during the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified.99  While this view is plausible, the lack of substantive historical support 
leaves room for doubt. 
III.  WHAT’S WRONG WITH OUR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Law Office History 
Contributing to the conflicted character of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is the ambiguous historical material allowing for “law office 
history,” where each side selects historical accounts that best support its 
position.100  Two of the most significant Supreme Court cases decided on this 
subject matter, Everson and Reynolds, have been accused of goal-oriented “law 
office history.”101 
The same accusation can be made on either side.102  With both sides 
possessing the ability to selectively pick desirable support, having an objective, 
honest argument is especially difficult.103  Interestingly, advocates on both sides 
of the debate believe that they are adopting the true original meaning.104  With 
numerous inconsistencies and a dearth of evidence, it is difficult to decide which 
side is definitively correct.  This creates a majority of the confusion and 
“hopeless disarray” in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.105  Many Supreme 
Court Justices are guilty of “law office history” in applying Establishment 
Clause tests.106 
                                                     
 96. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Establishment Clause resists incorporation); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679–80 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 97. See sources cited supra note 96. 
 98. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 235. 
 99. Id. at 322. 
 100. Id. at 8. 
 101. Id. at 10–11. 
 102. Id. at 11. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 13–14. 
 105. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 106. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 79–80. 
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B.  Inconsistent Application of Tests 
Courts employ several different tests to assess government action under the 
Establishment Clause.107  The available tests include: the coercion test, which is 
used, for example, in school prayer evaluations;108 neutrality analysis, often 
applied to assess government aid to religious schools;109 the endorsement  
test, applied to government displays, legislation, and government 
communications;110 and the Lemon test, as outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman,111 
used in many instances (except—for now—legislative prayer, as discussed 
below).112  These tests are applied inconsistently.113  The “law office history” 
phenomenon has its analogue in the sphere of judicial tests.114  These several 
analytical options allow a judge to pick whichever test best facilitates his or her 
desired outcome. 
C.  Prior and Current Tests 
Each of the extant Establishment Clause tests possesses strengths and 
weaknesses.115  The unpredictable nature in choosing and applying them is a 
significant problem.116  Another issue is that the use of any of these tests may 
allows the most important consideration to be cast aside: the basic principles of 
the Establishment Clause itself.117 
1.  The Lemon Test 
In Lemon,118 the Supreme Court established a three-part test to assess whether 
a government action violates the Establishment Clause.119  The Lemon test 
examines whether: (1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose;120 (2) its 
                                                     
 107. See infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
 109. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002). 
 110. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). 
 111. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 112. See id. at 614–15. 
 113. See generally Emily Fitch, Note, An Inconsistent Truth: The Various Establishment 
Clause Tests as Applied in the Context of Public Displays of (Allegedly) “Religious” Symbols and 
Their Applicability Today, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 431 (2014). 
 114. See infra Part III.C. 
 115. Fitch, supra note 113, at 434. 
 116. See, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d, Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (emphasis added) (“We are free to apply 
any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them.  Because we 
conclude that the school district policy impermissibly coerces a religious act and accordingly hold 
the policy unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the policy fails the endorsement test or 
the Lemon test as well.”). 
 117. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.1–3. 
 118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 119. Id. at 612–13. 
 120. Id. at 612. 
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primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion;121 and (3) it fosters 
excessive government entanglement with religion.122  If a statute fails any of 
these prongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.123  In the majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote that the First Amendment sought to foreclose 
the principle evil of “political division along religious lines.”124  Chief Justice 
Burger believed that aid to religious schools could pose a danger of 
unconstitutional entanglement due to this division.125 
The primary arguments against the Lemon test are that it is too restrictive, not 
reflective of the underlying principles, and results in unpredictable 
application.126  Assessing the true “purpose” of legislation allows for unreliable 
speculation.127  Although this test was popular for some time, its application has 
since diminished and has been strongly criticized by some current Supreme 
Court Justices.128  In Van Orden v. Perry,129 the Supreme Court specifically 
declined to use the Lemon test in validating a Ten Commandments monument 
displayed on government property.130  Yet, in a case decided the same day as 
Van Orden, McCreary County v. ACLU,131 the Court employed the Lemon test 
to strike down a display of Ten Commandments in county courthouses.132 
                                                     
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 613. 
 123. Id. at 612–13. 
 124. Id. at 622. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2006) (“The Court’s first formal methodology for analyzing 
Establishment Clause issues, the so-called Lemon test, proved so ad hoc and unpredictable in 
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 127. Choper, supra note 53, at 609. 
 128. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia criticizes the Lemon test, advocating for it to be dismantled 
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Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of 
Center Moriches Free Union School District. . . .  Over the years . . . no fewer than five 
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we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. 
Id. at 398–99. 
 129. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 130. Id. at 686. 
 131. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 132. Id. at 859–60. 
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In 1983, the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers133 did not even mention 
the Lemon test in upholding the use of a legislative chaplain to offer prayers to 
open sessions of the Nebraska Legislature.134  Had the Marsh Court applied the 
Lemon test, Nebraska’s practice would likely have been held unconstitutional.135  
Instead, the Court deemed the historical fact of the uninterrupted existence of a 
decidedly non-secular legislative prayer practice throughout the history of the 
nation to support its constitutional propriety.136  Marsh, then, implies doubt that 
the Lemon test is consistent with the Framers’ intent and the original meaning of 
the Clause.137  In any event, the fact that the Supreme Court treats the Lemon 
test as optional facilitates analytical selectivity, paralleling the historical 
selectivity critiqued above.138 
2.  Endorsement Test 
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,139 Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor proposed a new Establishment Clause test that would ask whether 
state action “intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.”140  She urged this to be an improvement upon Lemon, as the Court 
would not have to speculate about the effects of state action.141  The Court is 
expected to employ this test from the perspective of the reasonable observer.142  
As Justice Thomas opined in Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. American Atheists, 
Inc.,143 the Court’s assessment of reasonableness is arbitrary at best.144 
3.  Neutrality Test 
Another test the Supreme Court has employed in Establishment Clause cases 
is the “neutrality” test.145  “Neutrality” has been interpreted multiple ways.146  
Often, the neutrality test is interpreted as “evenhandedness.”147  However, 
neutrality has also been interpreted as a “secular purpose” test, which 
                                                     
 133. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 134. Id. at 795. 
 135. Id. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 790–91 (majority opinion). 
 138. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 139. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 140. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 141. Id. at 688–89. 
 142. Id. at 690. 
 143. 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 144. Id. at 21. 
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 146. See id. at 670 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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controversially stipulates that a secular purpose is neutral and a religious one is 
non-neutral.148 
The “evenhandedness” interpretation of neutrality presents two virtues: (1) it 
is more consistent with historical practices from around the Founding Era to 
allow at least some aid for religious missions;149 and (2) it protects what seems 
to be the widely agreed upon purpose of the Clause: to prohibit a national 
establishment of religion.150 
Nevertheless, this approach also has weaknesses.151  First, “evenhandedness” 
is arguably not the original intent or meaning of the Establishment Clause.152  
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace highlights that neither Madison’s intent 
nor the congressional debate records evince a concern with ensuring neutrality 
from the government.153 
The ability of the federal government to be “evenhanded” is questionable, 
especially because there are significantly more religions in America today than 
in the Founding Era.154  Therefore, one may argue, as Justice Hugo Black did,155 
that a strict separation between church and state should be maintained, as 
preferentialism could otherwise inevitably result.  While this test contains flaws, 
governmental evenhandedness between religions, as well as between religion 
and irreligion, likely comes closer to achieving the intended result, relative to 
other tests.156 
The secular purpose test, on the other hand, fails for a few reasons: (1) in most 
cases, the purpose of legislation is irrelevant in evaluating its constitutionality; 
(2) even if the purpose of legislation was relevant, discerning legislative intent 
is inherently speculative and unreliable; and (3) requiring a secular purpose for 
all laws would effectively establish a secularist religion by privileging a non-
theistic creed or philosophy as the lone driver of public policy.157  Moreover, 
this test breeds confusion, especially when government aid to religions may have 
a secular purpose.  Nevertheless, modern political discourse encourages this 
approach.158 
                                                     
 148. See Steven D. Smith, The Paralyzing Paradox of Religious Neutrality 4 (Research Paper 
No. 11-060, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911399. 
 149. See Barton, supra note 23, at 408; cf. Davids, supra note 27, at 377. 
 150. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 232, 235–36. 
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4.  Coercion Test 
The Supreme Court has also employed the coercion test, especially in school 
prayer cases.159  Although preventing coercion of religious practices is surely an 
intent underlying the religion clauses,160 the use of this test by the Supreme 
Court, like many of the others, has tended toward broader application than 
envisioned by the historical concern.161  For instance, in Lee v. Weisman,162 the 
Court adopted a “psychological coercion” standard that forbade an invocation at 
a public high school graduation ceremony.163  The Court ruled that the social 
expectations present in that ceremony exerted pressure on non-adherents to stand 
or otherwise appear approving during the prayer, which constitutes unlawful 
coercion.164  Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent maintained that only governmental 
actions, such as forced attendance of religious services, would be a First 
Amendment violation and urged the return to a “legal coercion” standard.165 
IV.  TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY: HOPEFUL CLARITY OR HOPELESS 
DISARRAY? 
Given the variability and inconsistent application of tests for the 
Establishment Clause, when Town of Greece166 reached the Supreme Court, it 
was uncertain which test would govern.  In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court 
evaluated the practice of the town of Greece, New York, to invite local clergy 
members to offer prayers to open its monthly board meetings.167  Members of 
the public often attended the meetings.168  These meetings served both legislative 
and adjudicative purposes.169  Originally, selection for the chaplain of the month 
was based on a Board representative calling congregations within Greece that 
                                                     
 159. This test was first discussed in Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Allegheny County v. ACLU.  
492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  “Under [the coercion] test the government 
does not violate the establishment clause unless it (1) provides direct aid to religion in a way that 
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against their will.”  Establishment Clause Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Sept. 16, 2011), 
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 160. See HAMBURGER, supra note 33, at 62. 
 161. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
Court’s holding expands the coercion test to prohibit a prayer ceremony that has traditionally been 
a part of American history). 
 162. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 163. Id. at 631–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
 165. Id. at 640–41, 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have made clear our understanding that 
school prayer occurs within a framework in which legal coercion to attend school (i.e., coercion 
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 166. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 167. Id. at 1815. 
 168. Id. at 1846 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 1849 (majority opinion). 
2015] Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment Clause 403 
were listed in a local directory.170  Later, the Board solely relied on a list of 
chaplains who previously volunteered.171  Almost all of the congregations in 
Greece were Christian.172  Accordingly, every participating minister between 
1999 and 2007 was Christian.173  The ministers’ prayers contained both civic 
and Christian themes.174 
In 2010, two local residents brought suit claiming that Greece’s legislative 
prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause.175  These residents alleged 
that Greece excluded non-Christian prayer and impermissibly permitted 
sectarian prayer.176  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New 
York found in favor of Greece under a neutrality theory because the town 
exercised “no impermissible preference for Christianity.”177  The District Court 
further reasoned that the governing Supreme Court precedent of Marsh v. 
Chambers did not require legislative prayer to be non-sectarian.178  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court,179 applying 
the endorsement test and holding that the prayer practice in Greece conveyed its 
official affiliation with Christianity to a reasonable objective observer.180 
On May 5, 2014, in a narrow 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Second Circuit.181  The Court focused on the longstanding 
tradition of legislative prayer in the United States.182  The fact that the First 
Congress appointed official chaplains demonstrated that this kind of legislative 
prayer was contemplated and accepted by the Framers.183  A notable aspect of 
the Court’s opinion was not the focus on tradition, which followed Marsh, but 
rather the Justices’ wide variation regarding which test should be used in 
Establishment Clause cases.184 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, did not even 
discuss the Lemon test.185  The Court also did not discuss the endorsement test 
explicitly,186 though Justice Kennedy invoked the reasonable observer when 
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analyzing whether Greece’s practices were coercive.187  Justice Thomas 
concurred,188 emphasizing the Establishment Clause as an enhanced federalism 
provision that resists incorporation.189  On the other hand, Justice Elena Kagan’s 
dissent urged religious equality as a governing norm.190  Overall, the bulk of the 
Court’s decision seemingly focused on coercion.191  Even after Town of Greece, 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is just as uncertain as it previously was.192 
A.  Ways to Improve 
The controversies over Establishment Clause interpretations seem endless.  
Supreme Court Justices widely differ in their interpretations.193  Evidence 
suggests that even the Framers differed in their intentions and interpretations.194  
Although achieving perfect agreement in the Establishment Clause may never 
happen, modest improvements can be made. 
1.  Remedy the Doctrinal Jumble 
It is long overdue for the Court to remedy its doctrinal jumble.195  This will 
require, of course, overruling longstanding precedent.  Maintaining bad law for 
a longer period of time does not improve it.  The Court declaring a more 
definitive test or at least overruling incorrect precedent, like the Lemon test, 
would be helpful.  Admittedly, making a single test absolutely controlling is 
risky, especially given the conflicting history.196  A better approach might be to 
focus on the principles underlying the Establishment Clause and compare 
upcoming cases to those principles.197  This way, courts are forced to go back to 
the text when interpreting it, instead of analyzing the Establishment Clause 
through the lens of new doctrinal language such as “endorsement” or 
“neutrality.”198  The Supreme Court seems to have focused on these underlying 
principles in Town of Greece, yet each Justice came to a different conclusion 
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with tradition only winning by a slim margin.199  Although a more definitive test 
would be helpful in limiting judicial policy discretion, focusing on such 
principles should result in more consistent long-term results.  Yet, the Supreme 
Court appears inclined to avoid the task of clarifying Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.200 
2.  Proposal for Adjusting the Level of Scrutiny 
The Court will typically use the variety of tests discussed above to resolve an 
Establishment Clause case.201  The use and credibility of these tests remains 
uncertain and ever changing.202  There is at least one instance in which the Court 
refused to use one of the previously mentioned tests and instead applied a strict 
scrutiny test as an alternative.203 
In Larson v. Valente,204 the Court evaluated a Minnesota statute intended to 
protect charitable contributors by requiring tax-deductible charitable 
organizations to register with the state.205  The statute exempted religious 
organizations from registering if more than half of their contributions were from 
their members.206  Well-established churches qualified for this exemption, while 
newer churches did not.207  Accordingly, the Court held that the statute 
differentiated among religious organizations and thus required strict scrutiny 
review.208  As a result, a religiously preferential statute is invalid “unless it is 
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in adjudging its constitutionality.  The fifty per cent rule of [the statute] clearly grants 
denominational preferences of the sort consistently and firmly deprecated in our 
precedents.  Consequently, that rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a 
compelling governmental interest. . . .  Although application of the Lemon tests is not 
necessary to the disposition of the case before us, those tests do reflect the same concerns 
that warranted the application of strict scrutiny to [the statute’s] fifty per cent rule. 
Id. at 246–47, 252 (internal citations omitted). 
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justified by a compelling governmental interest and unless it is closely fitted to 
further that interest.”209 
Since Larson, the Court has rarely used strict scrutiny for an Establishment 
Clause analysis.210  Nevertheless, any attempts to solidify a definitive test will 
likely be futile given all the uncertainty and differing interpretations surrounding 
the original intent and meaning of the Establishment Clause.  A better, more 
consistent, solution instead would be to adjust the level of scrutiny for 
Establishment Clause issues and exclude other judicially made tests (such as the 
Lemon test, coercion test, or neutrality test) from the analysis. 
Even if Justice Thomas’s view of “resisting incorporation” is correct, the legal 
community is unlikely to adopt this interpretation in the short term.211  The Bill 
of Rights and religious liberty are thought of as “American” rights, not just 
“federal” rights.212  Much of the public takes for granted that the religion clauses 
will be applicable against the states, regardless of what the historical evidence 
presents.213  Furthermore, since the Supreme Court long ago held that the 
religion clauses apply to the states,214 it would be disruptive to depart from that 
settled position in favor of an uncertain, historical perspective, even if 
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the law facially differentiates among religions.”); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Larson test should apply, stating that “Larson indicates that laws discriminating 
among religions are subject to strict scrutiny . . . [and] we see no justification for applying strict 
scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) 
(justifying the refusal to use the Lemon test in Larson); see also Russell W. Galloway, Basic 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845, 853 (1989) (discussing strict 
scrutiny in the Establishment Clause analysis). 
 211. See supra Part II.D. 
 212. See HAMBURGER, supra note 33, at 434–49. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).  In discussing the incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause to the States, the Everson Court elaborated: 
The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, commands that 
a state “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”  These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early 
Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished 
to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity.  Doubtless 
their goal has not been entirely reached; but so far has the Nation moved toward it that 
the expression “law respecting an establishment of religion,” probably does not so vividly 
remind present-day Americans of the evils, fears, and political problems that caused that 
expression to be written into our Bill of Rights. 
Id.  The proposition that the First Amendment, including the Establishment Clause, applies to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment remains a well-settled claim; however, Justice Thomas is one 
of the few opponents of this position.  See supra Part II.D. 
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plausible.215  Nevertheless, the federalism consideration otherwise can be taken 
into some account. 
Accordingly, this Essay proposes that the appropriate standard of review for 
Establishment Clause cases regarding state action should be rational basis or 
intermediate scrutiny.  Alternatively, evaluating federal action under the 
Establishment Clause should be subject to strict scrutiny, as an overwhelming 
majority of evidence points to the purpose and intent of the Establishment Clause 
being a prohibition of an established national religion.216  However, all cases 
implicating the Free Exercise Clause, whether state or federal, should be subject 
to strict scrutiny.217  Inasmuch as the Free Exercise Clause was meant to protect 
an individual right, it was reasonably incorporated against the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.218 
Town of Greece did not discuss which level of scrutiny is appropriate.219  This 
is unsurprising given the Court’s trend of staying away from discussing 
standards of review since the Larson Court and moving towards using judicially 
made tests.220  The Court, however, stated that “[a]ny test the Court adopts must 
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the 
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”221  This suggests that this area of 
the law is better suited to the legislature, which can better adjust to the changes 
in time and politics.222  Relatedly, the actions of the Framers surrounding the 
Establishment Clause may be a result of the political discourse of the time it was 
enacted. 
This Essay’s proposal to adjust the level of scrutiny is not as simple as it 
sounds.223  The question of appropriate scrutiny is subject to even more debate 
than the Establishment Clause.224  This Essay does not attempt to single-
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handedly solve the problems of Establishment Clause jurisprudence or answer 
every question regarding proper levels of scrutiny in religion cases.  Instead, it 
hopes to open the door to further discussion about this possibility and whether 
adjusting the level of scrutiny better reflects the Framers’ intent and the original 
meaning of the Clause regarding deference to state government action. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
An examination of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court makes clear that this area of the law is in hopeless disarray.  When the 
Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to substantially clarify the law in 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, it was unwilling or unable to do so.225  For the 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to reach a point of hopeful clarity seems 
impossible.  While the Court’s ability to make the Establishment Clause doctrine 
consistent and sensible may be in the distant future, modest steps toward that 
goal can be taken sooner.  This Essay aims to spark discussion regarding this 
area of the law and whether amending the level of scrutiny could be an 
improvement for Establishment Clause cases moving forward. 
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